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THE DUALITY GAP FOR TWO-TEAM ZERO-SUM GAMES
LEONARD J. SCHULMAN AND UMESH V. VAZIRANI
Abstract. We consider multiplayer games in which the players fall in two teams of size k,
with payoﬀs equal within, and of opposite sign across, the two teams. In the classical case of
k = 1, such zero-sum games possess a unique value, independent of order of play. However,
this fails for all k > 1; we can measure this failure by a duality gap, which quantiﬁes the
beneﬁt of being the team to commit last to its strategy. We show that the gap equals
2(1 − 21−k) for m = 2 and 2(1 − m−(1−o(1))k) for m > 2, with m being the size of the
action space of each player. Extensions hold also for diﬀerent-size teams and players with
various-size action spaces.
We further study the eﬀect of exchanging order of commitment among individual players
(not only among the entire teams).
The class of two-team zero-sum games is motivated from the weak selection model of
evolution, and from considering teams such as ﬁrms in which independent players (ideally)
have shared utility.
JEL code: C72 Noncooperative Games
1. Introduction
Games between teams of players are ubiquitous; in the economy this occurs most prominently
in competition between ﬁrms. Another case of signiﬁcance is that in which a team is a
biological species and the players on the team are the genes of the species. What makes a
set of players a team, in our idealization, is that in any outcome the players in the set receive
identical payoﬀs. This is consistent with existing terminology in economics [8, 9].1
Competition among ﬁrms or species need not be zero-sum; however, the zero-sum case will be
the focus of this paper, being the most basic form of competition, and often an approximation
to reality. Speciﬁcally, a two-team zero-sum game is a multiplayer game in which the players
are partitioned into two sets A and B, and a real-valued payoﬀ tensor (of dimension equal to
the number of players) speciﬁes the payoﬀ conditional on player actions; this payoﬀ accrues
positively to each player of Team B and negatively to each player of Team A.
If perfect coordination within each team can be achieved, then a zero-sum interaction between
two teams is nothing but a zero-sum interaction between two “virtual” players. In the
biological setting, the opposite extreme is relevant: an important model in evolutionary
theory is the weak selection model (see [11, 1, 13, 12, 17, 18, 4, 10]), in which a species is a
team, the genes are the players, the alleles of the gene are the possible actions of a player, and
the allele frequencies are independent across genes. Likewise, the diﬃculty of coordination
has long been treated in the economic literature as one of the forces limiting the size of
ﬁrms [5].
1Marschak, 1955: “We deﬁne a team as a group of persons each of whom takes decisions about something
diﬀerent but who receive a common reward as the joint result of all those decisions.”
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This raises a natural question: does von Neumann’s minimax theorem for zero-sum games
continue to hold for a zero-sum team game where the individual members of the team play
independently, and if not, by how much it is violated? Formally, such violation is expressed
through a duality gap between the values of the game (always expressed as the payoﬀ to Team
B) under two scenarios: when all members of Team A must ﬁrst commit to their randomized
strategies, and then Team B gets to respond; and when all members of Team B must commit,
and then Team A gets to respond.
Our work in Section 3 is the ﬁrst quantiﬁcation of the range of the duality gap. For two
teams each of size k, we determine, for action spaces of size 2, the exact range; for action
spaces of any size m > 2 we determine, as a function of k, the asymptotics of the range.
The key lemma in the lower bound on the duality gap for m > 2 may be of independent
interest: ﬁx a random set S of g(m)m-ary strings of any length k. Then with high probability,
any product distribution may place probability more thanm−k(1−o(1)) on at most O(log g(m))
strings in S. For comparison, m−k is the probability assigned by the uniform distribution.
In Section 4 we go on to investigate how the value of a game can be aﬀected by more
incremental changes, speciﬁcally, by exchanging the order of two players of opposing teams
who were committing to their randomized strategies in immediate succession. There are
games with duality gap bounded away from 0, in which all these value changes tend to 0 in
k; whereas there are other games, including games symmetric within each team, in which the
largest such value change is bounded away from 0 as a function of k.
The duality gap is the sum of two other quantities, the defensive gaps of the two teams.
The defensive gap of Team B is the diﬀerence between the payoﬀ to Team B if Team A
must play a product strategy, and the payoﬀ to Team B if Team A can use a joint source of
randomness (hidden of course from B). Symmetrically we have the defensive gap of Team A.
The defensive gap quantiﬁes the reduction in eﬀectiveness of a team when its members are
unable to use a joint source of randomness.
Two decades ago von Stengel and Koller studied the special case of a single player A playing
against a team B [16]. They focused on what they called team-maxmin strategies of Team
B: product strategies which maximize the minimum payoﬀ to B over responses of A. Their
main result was that any team-maxmin strategy can be completed to a Nash equilibrium of
the game by a suitable response distribution for A. To show that this was a novel prediction
(and not merely about two-player zero-sum games) they gave an example of a game with two
players on Team B in which the defensive gap of Team B is positive.
The defensive gap may be compared to two other notions in the literature. Assume Team A
goes ﬁrst, and think just of the multiplayer game being played by the k players of Team A.
(Since Team B can respond optimally, even deterministically, once the strategies of Team A
have been ﬁxed, we may ignore the players of Team B and consider their response merely
part of the deﬁnition of the game being played by Team A.) Then, since the payoﬀs to all
players in Team A are identical, the defensive gap is the diﬀerence between the value of the
best correlated equilibrium [3] and the best Nash equilibrium [15]. It quantiﬁes, if you will,
the penalty for not coordinating. Again, since the payoﬀs are identical within the team, social
welfare agrees with individual welfare, and so the defensive gap is, conceptually, a Price of
Stability [14] (although that “price” is normally deﬁned as a ratio and not a diﬀerence).
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2. Preliminaries
We consider two-team zero-sum games in which Team A has k players each with m choices
in its action space; likewise for Team B. The payoﬀ (to Team B) is speciﬁed by a tensor T in
(Rm)⊗2k. (In the biological setting, each of A and B is a species with a genome of k genes,
each taking on one of m possible alleles.) More formally to each player An, n = 1, . . . , k of
Team A corresponds a vector space Un ∼= Rm, and to each player Bn, n = 1, . . . , k of Team B,
a vector space Vn ∼= Rm. Space Un is spanned by a basis which we denote un,0, . . . , un,m−1.
Similarly for Vn. In this setting T ∈ U∗1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ U∗k ⊗ V ∗1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ V ∗k . (With ∗ denoting
dualization.) Letting I = (i1, . . . , ik) ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1}k represent an action of the players of
Team A, and J = (j1, . . . , jk) ∈ {0, . . . ,m − 1}k an action of the players of Team B, TJI is
the payoﬀ to players of Team B (and minus the payoﬀ to players of Team A).
In the casem = 2, the strategy of player An is speciﬁed by a parameter 0 ≤ pn ≤ 1 which is the
probability with which he plays choice 0, i.e., vector un,0. Likewise player Bn has a parameter
0 ≤ qn ≤ 1 which is the probability with which he plays choice 0, i.e., vector vn,0. For m > 2,
the strategy of player An is speciﬁed by a probability distribution pn = (pn,0, . . . , pn,m−1) and
the strategy of player Bn is speciﬁed by a probability distribution qn = (qn,0, . . . , qn,m−1).
(Thus for m = 2, pn is shorthand for (pn, 1− pn) = (pn,0, pn,1).)
We let T qp denote the expected payoﬀ to Team B when the players of Team A use distributions
pn and those of Team B use distributions qj . This notation generalizes the notation T
J
I , if
one interprets I as the probability distribution on {0, . . . ,m−1}k supported solely on I (and
similarly for J). Equivalently, T qp equals the scalar given by contracting T with the tensor
product of the vectors (pn,0, . . . , pn,m−1) (ranging over n) and (qn,0, . . . , qn,m−1) (ranging over
j).
By a standard argument, minpmaxq T
q
p ≥ maxq minp T qp . (We write everywhere min or max
rather than inf or sup since the spaces are compact.) However, apart from the linear (k = 1)
case, the gap minpmaxq T
q
p −maxq minp T qp can be positive.
Our purpose is to quantify this gap relative to the uniform norm ‖T‖∞ = maxI,J |TJI |. We
deﬁne the duality gap of tensor T :
(2.1) gap(T ) =
minpmaxq T
q
p −maxq minp T qp
‖T‖∞ =
minpmaxJ T
J
p −maxq minI T qI
‖T‖∞
where as above, I or J represent the pure strategy choosing that action.
Let Teamm,k denote the collection of two-team games with teams of size k and action spaces
of size m. The principal quantity of interest is
(2.2) gapm,k = max
T∈Teamm,k
gap(T )
It is trivial that gapm,k ≤ 2. Moreover gapm,k is nondecreasing in k (because one may ignore
the actions of players after the k’th player on each team), and in m (because one may map
all actions ≥ m− 1 to action m− 1).
Here and throughout the paper, upper-case P and Q denote mixed strategies of virtual
players; that is to say, each is a general probability tensor (a tensor with nonnegative entries
summing to 1), P ∈ U1⊗ . . .⊗Uk and Q ∈ V1⊗ . . .⊗Vk. Lower-case p and q denote product
distributions, i.e., rank-one probability tensors.
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Extending the existing notation, TQP is the expected payoﬀ to B when A (as a virtual player)
uses distribution P and B uses distribution Q. It is also useful to employ the standard
convention that a repeated index indicates tensor contraction over that index, so P ITJI =
TJP ∈ V ∗1 ⊗ . . .⊗ V ∗k and QJTJI = TQI ∈ U∗1 ⊗ . . .⊗ U∗k .
By strong LP duality we can deﬁne the value of the virtual player game by
(2.3) ValT = min
P
max
J
{P ITJI } = max
Q
min
I
{QJTJI }.
Let P and Q be strategies achieving equality in (2.3). We can usefully reﬁne the study of
gap(T ) by deﬁning the defensive gap of Team A in tensor T as
gapA(T ) =
minpmaxJ{pITJI } −maxJ{P ITJI }
‖T‖∞ =
minpmaxJ{pITJI } −ValT
‖T‖∞
where, of course, p ranges over product distributions. Likewise the defensive gap of Team B
is
gapB(T ) =
minI{QJTJI } −maxq minI{qJTJI }
‖T‖∞ =
ValT −maxq minI{qJTJI }
‖T‖∞
The defensive gap quantiﬁes the reduced eﬀectiveness of a team of players (when forced to
commit to a mixed strategy to which the other team has a chance to respond), as compared
with a virtual player (in the same situation).
3. The Defensive Gaps and the Duality Gap
In case the two teams have sizes kA, kB, and the players of the two teams have action spaces of
various sizes, let (mA,1, . . . ,mA,k) be the numbers of actions available to the respective players
of team A and (mB,1, . . . ,mB,k) the numbers of actions available to the respective players
of team B. Without loss of generality every mA,n,mB,n ≥ 2. Let k = min{kA, kB}. Let
mˆA, mˆB be the geometric means mˆA =
∏
nm
1/kA
A,n and mˆB =
∏
nm
1/kB
B,n ; let mA = maxmA,n
and mB = maxmB,n. (Naturally, when all action spaces are the same size, m = mˆA =
mA = mˆB = mB.) Let TeammˆA,mA,mˆB ,mB ,k be the set of two-team games consistent with the
indicated parameters and let gapmˆA,mA,mˆB ,mB ,k denote the maximum duality gap for games
in TeammˆA,mA,mˆB ,mB ,k.
Henceforth scale any T 	= 0 so that ‖T‖∞ = 1.
The implicit variable in all “o(1)” is k, thus, ε(k) ∈ o(1) means that limk→∞ ε(k) = 0.
Theorem 1. gap2,k = 2(1 − 21−k), and for every m > 2, 2(1 − m−(1−o(1))k) ≤ gapm,k ≤
2(1−m1−k). More speciﬁcally:
(1) Upper bounds:
gapA(T ) ≤ (1−ValT )(1− mˆ1−kAA ) and gapB(T ) ≤ (1 + ValT )(1− mˆ1−kBB ).
(2) Lower bounds:
(a) gap2,k ≥ 2(1− 21−k).
(b) For every m > 2 there is a function ε(k) ∈ o(1) such that gapm,k ≥ 2(1 −
m−(1−ε(k))k).
(c) For every 1 < mˆA ≤ mA and 1 < mˆB ≤ mB there is a function ε(k) ∈ o(1) such
that gapmˆA,mA,mˆB ,mB ,k ≥ 2− mˆ
−(1−ε(k))kA
A − mˆ−(1−ε(k))kBB .
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Proof.
Part (1): Upper Bounds on the Defensive and Duality Gaps.
It suﬃces to show the claim for gapA. The claim for gapB follows by negating all entries of T ,
reversing the roles of the teams and applying the claim for gapA. Recall also that gap(T ) =
gapA(T ) + gapB(T ); if mˆA = mˆB and kA = kB then this means that gap(T ) ≤ 2(1− mˆ1−kA ).
Given an arbitrary coordinated mixed strategy P for team A, we wish to convert it to a
rank-one probability tensor (a product distribution) that does no worse than the claimed
defensive gap. The natural candidate would be by independent random variables having
the same marginals as P . That is, for any player 1 ≤ n ≤ kA set pn to be the marginal
distribution of P at player n, speciﬁcally, for any action 0 ≤ i ≤ mA,n − 1
pn(i) =
∑
I such that in=i
P I
and, letting
(3.1) p = (p1(0), . . . , p1(mA,1 − 1))⊗ . . .⊗ (pkA(0), . . . , pkA(mA,kA − 1)),
use p as the rank-one strategy replacing P . But it turns out that this approach cannot be
used to prove any bound on the defensive gap (see Appendix B).
Surprisingly, there is a less obvious rank-one strategy which can be obtained from P , and
which provides a tight bound on the defensive gap.
For this purpose we show the existence of a distribution βn(0), . . . , βn(mA,n− 1) for player n
such that for every i, βn(i)
kA ≥ m1−kAA,n pn(i), which is to say,
(3.2) βn(i) ≥ m1/kA−1A, pn(i)1/kA .
Such a distribution exists due to the inequality∑
i
(mA,npn(i))
1/kA
mA,n
≤ 1,
which holds because by the power-mean inequality(∑
i
(mA,npn(i))
1/kA
mA,n
)kA
≤
∑
i
mA,npn(i)
mA,n
= 1.
We now deﬁne the product distribution β which demonstrates the defensive gap by βI =∏kA
1 βn(in). We claim that for every I, β
I ≥ mˆ1−kAA P I . Note that for every n and in,
pn(in) ≥ P I . Applying 3.2 we have
βI ≥
∏
n
m
1/kA−1
A,n pn(i)
1/kA ≥ P I
∏
n
m
1/kA−1
A,n = P
Imˆ1−kAA
as required. Recalling that ‖T‖∞ ≤ 1, we have that for every J :
βITJI ≤ 1− mˆ1−kAA + mˆ1−kAA P ITJI
which (upper bounding P ITJI by ValT , and subtracting ValT from each side) completes the
proof of Part (1) of the theorem.
Part (2a): Lower Bound on gap2,k.
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Write 0 = (0, . . . , 0) and 1 = (1, . . . , 1).
Consider the following tensor (explicitly written out for the case k = 2 in Appendix A).
Example 2. ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
G0I =
{
−1 if I = 0
1 otherwise
G1I =
{
−1 if I = 1
1 otherwise
GJ0 =
{
1 if J = 1
−1 otherwise
GJ1 =
{
1 if J = 0
−1 otherwise
GJI = 0 for all other I,J
(3.3)
An informal description of this game is that if both Team A and Team B choose actions in
{0,1}, then the outcome is as it would be in the “matching pennies” game. If just one of the
teams chooses an action in {0,1}, then that team wins. If neither team chooses an action in
{0,1}, then the game is a tie.
(We incidentally note that the proof of Part (2a) does not depend on setting entries to 0 in
the last line of 3.3; the argument will go through with each entry taking any value in [−1, 1].)
Now consider any strategy p = (p1, . . . , pk) for Team A (recall these are the probabilities of
action 0). The expected payoﬀ for action J = 0 of Team B is
G0p = 1− 2p1 · · · pk
The expected payoﬀ for J = 1 is
G1p = 1− 2(1− p1) · · · (1− pk)
By the arithmetic-geometric mean inequality, G0p ≥ 1− 2( 1k
∑
pn)
k and G1p ≥ 1− 2( 1k
∑
(1−
pn))
k. So
1−max{G0p , G1p}
2
≤ min{( 1
k
∑
pn)
k, (
1
k
∑
(1− pn))k}
equivalently (
1−max{G0p , G1p}
2
)1/k
≤ min{1
k
∑
pn,
1
k
∑
(1− pn)}
The RHS is at most 1/2. So minpmax{G0p , G1p} ≥ 1− 21−k.
A similar argument applied to the strategy q of Team B establishes that maxq min{Gq0, Gq1} ≤
−1 + 21−k. Adding the two contributions, Part (2a) of the theorem follows.
Part (2b): Lower Bound on gapm,k, m > 2.
Proof: We non-constructively exhibit a game establishing the lower bound. Remember m
is ﬁxed while k → ∞. We start by selecting, for a function g(h(m)) to be speciﬁed, g(h(m))
strings S = (s1, . . . , sg(h(m))), each sj chosen independently and uniformly in {0, . . . ,m−1}k.
A key part of the proof is the interesting fact that with high probability, this set (whose
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size is independent of k) has the property that for any product distribution, fewer than
h(m) ∼ log g(h(m)) strings in S have probability more than m−k(1−o(1)).
Formally, we argue that for a function h(m) that is suﬃciently large to satisfy conditions
(*), (**) below, and for g(h) = h22h, there exists a function ε1(k), tending to 0 as k → ∞,
such that w.h.p. over the selection (as described above) of g(h(m)) strings S, for every list
of player strategies p1, . . . , pk (pn is a distribution on {0, . . . ,m− 1} and p(s) =
∏k
1 pn(sn)),
the h(m)’th-largest p(s) is at most m−(1−ε1(k))k. This is the same as saying that for every
R ⊆ S, either |R| < h(m) or mins∈R p(s) ≤ m−(1−ε1(k))k.
To see this, consider selecting h(m) strings R = {r1, . . . , rh(m)} independently and uniformly
in {0, . . . ,m − 1}k. Denote by wn(j) the fraction of strings r ∈ R s.t. rn = j. Then by
standard concentration theorems [2], there is a suﬃciently large h(m) such that:
(*) There exist functions ε2, ε3, ε4 ∈ o(1) such that with probability at least 1 − ε2(k),
for all but ε3(k) · k coordinates n ∈ {1, . . . , k}, for every 0 ≤ j ≤ m− 1,
(3.4)
1− ε4(k)
m
≤ wn(j) ≤ 1 + ε4(k)
m
.
Examine the geometric mean (
∏
 p(r
))1/h(m) =
∏k
n=1[
∏m−1
j=0 pn(j)
wn(j)]. Upper bound this
by ignoring coordinates n for which there is a j failing either of the inequalities in (3.4) and
by noting that given wn(0), . . . , wn(m− 1), the distribution pn which maximizes the product
in brackets is pn(j) = wn(j). So
(
∏

p(r))1/h(m) ≤
((
1 + ε4(k)
m
)1−ε4(k))k(1−ε3(k))
≤
(
1
m
eε4(k)
)k(1−ε3(k))(1−ε4(k))
≤ m−k(1−ε3(k)−ε4(k))ekε4(k)
≤ m−k(1−ε3(k)−2ε4(k)).
We conclude that with probability at least 1−(g(h(m))
h(m)
)
ε2(k) over the selection of S, for every
product strategy p, the h(m)’th-largest p(s) is at most m−(1−ε1(k))k, where ε1 = ε3 + 2ε4.
Fix such a list S.
By a result of Erdo¨s [6] there is an h0 such that for every h ≥ h0, there is a tournament of size
g(h) that has no dominating set of size h. (A tournament is a digraph in which there is one
directed edge between every pair of distinct vertices. A set of vertices U dominates a vertex
j if some edge (u, j), u ∈ U , is present. A set of vertices U in a tournament is dominating if
it dominates all vertices outside U .) That is, for every set R of size h, there is some vertex s
outside R with edges pointing toward every vertex of R. (As an aside, Erdo¨s’s argument is
existential but with slight loss in the numbers, tournaments without small dominating sets
can be constructed explicitly [7].) Our second condition on h(m) is that
(**) h(m) ≥ h0.
The game is as follows. Associate the strings of S with the vertices of the tournament in an
arbitrary way. If neither team chooses a string in S, the game is a tie. If one team chooses
a string in S and the other does not, the ﬁrst team wins. If both teams choose strings in S,
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the winning vertex is that which points toward the other (with a tie for identical strings). In
all cases a win means a payoﬀ of 1 and a tie a payoﬀ of 0.
Now we claim that whichever team goes second can achieve payoﬀ 1 − m−(1−o(1))k. The
argument is the same for both teams, so say Team A goes ﬁrst and let p be its product
strategy. Let R = {r ∈ S : p(r) > m−(1−ε1(k))k}. There is an s ∈ S such that Team B
wins against every r ∈ R. Team B deterministically responds with this s. Team B wins
unless Team A selects an s′ ∈ S − R (and sometimes even then). The payoﬀ to Team B is
therefore at least 1− (g(h(m))− h(m))m−(1−ε1(k))k ≥ 1−mlogm g(h(m))−(1−ε1(k))k which, for
ε = ε1 +
1
k logm g(h(m)), is ≥ 1−m−(1−ε(k))k.
Part (2b) of the theorem follows.
Part (2c): Lower Bound on gapmˆA,mA,mˆB ,mB ,k.
The proof mimicks that of Part (2b), with a few more technicalities. As a ﬁrst step we
need a bipartite version of Erdo¨s’s theorem on tournaments. Let Tg,g′ be the set of bipartite
tournaments on vertex sets V with |V | = g and V ′ with |V ′| = g′, that is to say directed
graphs in which there are no edges within each of these sets, and with exactly one of the
edges (i, j), (j, i) present for i ∈ V, j ∈ V ′. We say that U is a dominating set in a bipartite
tournament if either U ⊆ V and U dominates all j ∈ V ′, or U ⊆ V ′ and U dominates all
j ∈ V .
Lemma 3. There is an h1 such that for every h ≥ h1 there is a bipartite tournament in Tg,g
for g = g(h) = h22h, that has no dominating set of size h.
Proof. The proof follows that of Erdo¨s. Select a bipartite tournament in Tg,g u.a.r. Consider
any U ⊆ V of size |U | = h. For j ∈ V ′, the probability that j is dominated by U is 1− 2−h.
The probability that every j ∈ V ′ is dominated by U is (1 − 2−h)g. The probability that
there exists a U which dominates every j ∈ V ′ is at most (gh)(1 − 2−h)g. We double this
quantity to allow also for a dominating U ⊆ V ′. Thus the probability a dominating set
exists is ≤ 2(gh)(1− 2−h)g ≤ 2(gh)e−g2−h ≤ eh log g−g2−h = eh(log 2)(h+2 lg h)−h2 (we have applied
the inequality 1 − x ≤ e−x), which is < 1 for suﬃciently large h. Hence there exist in Tg,g
bipartite tournaments without dominating sets of size h. 
Consider selecting some h(mˆA,mA) strings RA = (r
1
A, . . . , r
h(mˆA,mA)
A ) in
∏
n{0, . . . ,mA,n −
1} independently and uniformly. Let wA,n(j) be the fraction of strings in RA whose n’th
coordinate equals j.
For any functions ε2, ε3, ε4 → 0, by concentration theorems [2] the function h may be cho-
sen suﬃciently rapidly growing that for any coordinate n, Pr
(
|wA,n(j)− 1mA,n | >
ε4(k)
mA,n
)
<
ε2(k)ε3(k)/2.
If we also select h(mˆB,mB) strings RB in
∏
n{0, . . . ,mB,n−1} independently and uniformly,
and likewise deﬁne wB,n(j), then for any coordinate n, Pr
(
|wB,n(j)− 1mB,n | >
ε4(k)
mB,n
)
<
ε2(k)ε3(k)/2.
In particular, if we select RA and RB independently, then with probability at least 1− ε2(k)
the following both hold:
|DA| < ε3(k)kA and(3.5)
|DB| < ε3(k)kB
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where
DA = {n : |wA,n(j)− 1
mA,n
| > ε4(k)
mA,n
} and
DB = {n : |wB,n(j)− 1
mB,n
| > ε4(k)
mB,n
}.
Examine the geometric mean (
∏
 p(r

A))
1/h(mˆA) =
∏kA
n=1[
∏mA,n−1
j=0 pn(j)
wA,n(j)]. Conditional
on (3.5) holding, we upper bound this mean by ignoring coordinates n ∈ DA and by noting
that given wA,n(0), . . . , wA,n(mA,n − 1), the distribution pn which maximizes the product in
brackets is pn(j) = wA,n(j). So
(
∏

p(rA))
1/h(mˆA) ≤
∏
n/∈DA
(
1 + ε4(k)
mA,n
)1−ε4(k)
≤ (1 + ε4(k))kA
⎛
⎝ ∏
n/∈DA
1
mA,n
⎞
⎠
1−ε4(k)
Apply (
∏
n/∈DA
1
mA,n
)/(
∏
n
1
mA,n
) =
∏
n∈DA mA,n ≤ m
ε3(k)kA
A to get
(
∏

p(rA))
1/h(mˆA) ≤ (1 + ε4(k))kAmˆ−(1−ε4(k))kAA mε3(k)(1−ε4(k))kAA
= mˆ
−(1−ε4(k))(1− ε3(k) logmAlog mˆA −
log(1+ε4(k))
(1−ε4(k)) log mˆA )kA
A
= mˆ
(1−ε1(k))kA
A(3.6)
for some ε1(k) ∈ o(1).
Now let h = max{(h(mˆA,mA), (h(mˆB,mB)}. It follows from (3.6) that if we select g(h)
strings SA = (s
1
A, . . . , s
g(h)
A ) in
∏
n{0, . . . ,mA,n − 1} independently and uniformly, then with
probability at least 1 − (g(h)h )ε2(k) over the selection of SA, for every product strategy p,
the h’th-largest p(sA) is at most mˆ
−(1−ε1(k))k
A . The same claim holds for selection of a set
SB = (s
1
B, . . . , s
g(h)
B ) in
∏
n{0, . . . ,mB,n − 1}. Fix such lists SA, SB.
Now form a two-team game as follows. Associate SA and SB with the vertices of two sides
of a bipartite tournament with the dominating-set-free property ensured by Lemma 3. If
neither team chooses a string in SA or SB, the game is a tie. If Team A chooses a string in
SA and Team B does not choose a string in SB, Team A wins. Similarly Team B wins if it
selects a string in SB and Team A does not select a string in SA. If the teams choose strings
in SA and SB respectively, the winner is determined by the orientation of the tournament
edge. In all cases a win means a payoﬀ of 1 and a tie a payoﬀ of 0.
Now we claim that if Team B goes second it can achieve payoﬀ 1 − mˆ−(1−o(1))kAA ; likewise
if Team A goes second it can achieve payoﬀ 1 − mˆ−(1−o(1))kBB . The argument is the same
for both teams, so say Team A goes ﬁrst and let p be its product strategy. Let RA = {r ∈
SA : p(r) > mˆ
−(1−ε1(k))kA
A }. Since |RA| < h, there is an s ∈ SB that dominates every
r ∈ RA. Team B deterministically responds with this s. Team B wins unless Team A selects
an s′ ∈ SA − RA (and sometimes even then). The payoﬀ to Team B is therefore at least
1− (g(h)− h)mˆ−(1−ε1(k))kAA which, for ε = ε1 + 1kA logmˆA g(h), is ≥ 1− mˆ
−(1−ε(k))kA
A .
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Part (2c) of the theorem follows. 
4. Order Refinements
It is natural to consider a more general scenario in which players of the two teams commit
to their strategies in some (not necessarily strict) alternation. That is to say, let π be any
bijection from {1, . . . , 2k} to {A1, . . . , Ak, B1, . . . , Bk}. If π() = An for some n then let M()
be the quantiﬁer minpn (minimization over the distribution pn); if π() = Bn for some n then
let M() = maxqn . Then the value of game T with respect to order π is deﬁned to be
V (T, π) = M(1) . . .M(2k)T qp .
In particular, let πAB be an order in which all the members of Team A go ﬁrst, that is,
πAB() = A for  ≤ k, and πAB() = B−k for  > k. (Note that V is invariant under
exchange of same-team players with adjacent quantiﬁers.) Likewise let πBA be an order in
which Team B goes ﬁrst. Then the duality gap of game T is
gap(T ) = V (T, πAB)− V (T, πBA).
We now ask how much V may change when we change π by a single adjacent transposition.
The eﬀect of an adjacent transposition can be large, even if there are many players; this
phenomenon occurs for the following uninteresting reason. Consider games with k players
on each team, yet which depend on the actions of only two players from each team. This
already allows for games with a duality gap bounded away from 0 (speciﬁcally, as we saw, 1
in the case m = 2), yet the value of the game will change only under the four transpositions
which exchange two opposing signiﬁcant players. Necessarily, one of these increments is at
least 1/4.
If we are interested in the possibility, then, that for games with many players, V may change
only incrementally under adjacent transposition, then we must restrict the class of games
under consideration. A very natural restriction, which eliminates the previous example, is
to symmetric games, by which we mean games invariant under permutation of the actions
taken by members of a team.
It turns out, however, that even for symmetric games, adjacent transpositions can create
large jumps in the value of the game. For an example we return to the game G of Example 2.
We show that for any k, the order of the ﬁrst three players can aﬀect the outcome decisively.
Lemma 4. If  ≥ 3 is the ﬁrst time that Team B plays in π, then V (G, π) ≥ 1/2. Likewise
if  ≥ 3 is the ﬁrst time that Team A plays in π, then V (G, π) ≤ −1/2.
Proof. We argue only the case that Team A goes ﬁrst, the other case following similarly;
we further suppose, and due to the symmetries of G this is without loss of generality, that
players A1, A2 go ﬁrst. Having selected distributions p1, p2, the probability that both actions
are 0’s is p1p2, and the probability that both are 1’s is (1 − p1)(1 − p2). One of these
quantities is at most 1/4. If (a) p1p2 ≤ 1/4, all players of Team B choose action 0, and if (b)
(1− p1)(1− p2) < 1/4, all players of Team B choose action 1. In instance (a), the expected
payoﬀ is E0pG ≥ (3/4) · 1 + (1/4) · (−1) ≥ 1/2; the same payoﬀ bound follows similarly in
instance (b). 
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To quantify the eﬀect of this lemma, let τ,+1 be transposition of the ’th and ( + 1)’th
quantiﬁers. Since we can transition in four adjacent transpositions between a permutation
which favors Team A by 1/2, and one which favors Team B by 1/2, we have:
Corollary 5. There exists a permutation π and an  such that |V (G, τ,+1π) − V (G, π)| ≥
1/4.
Thus, despite the symmetry of the game, forcing a couple of members of one team to go ﬁrst
is enough to put that team at a signiﬁcant disadvantage.
In view of the above, it is worthwhile showing that there even exist games in which the
outcome is aﬀected only incrementally by the order of play. Speciﬁcally:
Theorem 6. There exist symmetric team games with any k ≥ 1 players per team, with duality
gap bounded away from 0 (as a function of k), but in which any adjacent transposition in the
order of play changes the value of the game only by O(1/k).
Proof. We use the following game with m = 2.
Example 7. For an action I ∈ {0, 1}k by the players of Team A, and an action J ∈ {0, 1}k
by the players of Team B, let x = the number of 1’s in I, y = the number of 1’s in J , and
deﬁne game H by:
(4.1) HJI = Hyx =
−4(2x− y − k/2)(x+ 2y − 3k/2)
9k2
(where H is a (k + 1)× (k + 1) matrix). Observe that ‖H‖∞ = 1.
We ﬁrst show that the duality gap of tensor H is bounded away from 0; this is for rea-
sons similar to, although slightly more complicated than, those of our previous example G.
Speciﬁcally, if Team A goes ﬁrst in H, it can pick a distribution p on x with arbitrary mean
0 ≤ μ ≤ k, and a variance σ2 that (because x is a sum of independent variables with variances
≤ 1/4) is bounded by k/4. Now Team B can choose y ∈ {0, k} so that |y − μ| ≥ k/2. Then
Hyp = −
4
9k2
E[(2(x− μ) + 2(μ− k/2)− (y − k/2))((x− μ) + (μ− k/2) + 2(y − k/2))]
= − 4
9k2
[2σ2 − 2(y − k/2)2 + 2(μ− k/2)2 + 3(μ− k/2)(y − k/2)]
≥ 4
9k2
[−k/2 + k2/2 + 3(k/2− μ)(3y + 2μ− 5k/2)]
The rule for selecting y ensures that the last term is nonnegative, so we have Hyp ≥ 2k(k−1)9k2
and consequently, for k ≥ 2, Hyp ≥ 1/9. That is to say, minpmaxq Hqp ≥ 1/9.
In order to complete this argument, note that under the rotation x → k − y, y → x, we have
−Hyx = Hxk−y.
Consequently, any distribution for x that Team A employs to ensure payoﬀ for Team B of
at most c can be translated by Team B into a distribution for y that ensures payoﬀ at least
−c; and any distribution for y that Team B employs to ensure a payoﬀ of at least −c, can
be translated by Team A into a distribution for x that ensures payoﬀ at most c.
It follows that maxq minpH
q
p ≤ −1/9. (And incidentally that ValH = 0.) Thus gap(H) ≥
2/9.
12 LEONARD J. SCHULMAN AND UMESH V. VAZIRANI
We now show that in this game, adjacent transpositions of the operators have only an incre-
mental eﬀect, in the sense discussed earlier. The basic reason is that Hyx has small Lipschitz
constant (with respect to the coordinates x, y), and therefore HJI has small Lipschitz constant
(with respect to Hamming distance h on I,J). We employ the following lemma.
Lemma 8. Let m = 2.
(1) For any T and S:
|V (T + S, π)− V (T, π)| ≤ ‖S‖∞.
(2) Let λ ≥ 0 and T be such that if h(I, I ′) = 1 and h(J ,J ′) = 1 hold for the tuple
I, I ′,J ,J ′, then |TJI − TJI′ | ≤ λ and |TJI − TJ
′
I | ≤ λ.
Then
|V (T, τ,+1π)− V (T, π)| ≤ λ/2.
Proof. (1) We show that Team B can ensure a payoﬀ of at least V (T, π)−‖S‖∞ when playing
game T + S, simply by pretending that it is playing game T . (The argument in the other
direction is identical.) Speciﬁcally, upon reaching a quantiﬁer M() which is controlled by
Team B, say M() = maxqn , player Bn chooses a distribution qn which is optimal in game
T against the distributions of the two teams which have already been ﬁxed for ′ < . The
payoﬀ is now (T + S)qp = T
q
p + S
q
p ≥ V (T, π) + Sqp ≥ V (T, π)− ‖S‖∞.
(2) We must show that if π() = An1 and π(+ 1) = Bn2 , then Team B can ensure a payoﬀ
of at least V (T, π)−λ when playing in the order τ,+1π, i.e., when An1 follows Bn2 . For any
choice of pn’s, each player Bn′ has a response q
π
n′ which is a function only of the pn’s that are
earlier in the order π (i.e., s.t. π−1(An) < π−1(Bn′)), such that T
qπ
p ≥ V (T, π). Note that by
observing the preceding pn’s chosen by Team A, a player Bn′ already implicitly knows how
the preceding members of Team B have responded, and so the function qπn′ does not need to
depend on those distribution choices.
The idea now is that for n′ 	= n2, player Bn′ simply makes the response qπn′ . Player Bn2
chooses the uniform distribution.
The implication is that for n′ s.t. π−1(Bn′) < , players Bn′ are responding optimally (w.r.t.
the order π) to Team A’s choices. For n′ s.t. π−1(Bn′) > +1, players Bn′ eﬀectively pretend
that player Bn2 also responded optimally (although it could not since it did not have available
pn1), and continue to make their own optimal responses to the pn’s.
Eventually, Team A has chosen some distributions pn, and Team B has chosen the distribu-
tions qn′ that are optimal responses w.r.t. order of play π, except that qn2 has been modiﬁed
to be the uniform distribution, for which we write un2 . So, instead of the product distribution
p1 × . . . × pk × qπ1 × . . . × qπk , the actual distribution is p1 × . . . × pk × qπ1 × . . . un2 . . . × qπk .
Conditional on any actions by the players other than Bn2 , then, the expected change in the
payoﬀ created by shifting between the two distributions, is at most λ/2. 
Now return to the game H. One may verify that for 0 ≤ x ≤ k and 0 ≤ y ≤ k − 1,
|Hyx −Hy+1x | ≤ 4(7k/2−2)9k2 ; likewise for 0 ≤ x ≤ k − 1 and 0 ≤ y ≤ k, |Hyx −Hyx+1| ≤ 4(7k/2−2)9k2 .
Consequently H has Lipschitz constant λ < 149k .
Applying Lemma 8(2), we conclude that for any π and , |V (H, τ,+1π) − V (H,π)| < 79k ,
completing the proof of the theorem. 
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5. Discussion
We have characterized the possible range of the duality gap. The examples which achieved
large gap were highly structured. It would be interesting to ﬁnd natural conditions on a game
(particularly a symmetric game) that ensure small duality gap.
It would be interesting to extend our inquiry to teams (possibly more than two) competing
in non-zero-sum games.
The example of Theorem 6 was constructed speciﬁcally in order to demonstrate that there
are games with large duality gap whose value is aﬀected only incrementally by the order of
play. It would be desirable to identify natural classes of, or good characterizations of, games
with this property.
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Appendix A. The lower bound tensor for m = 2, k = 2
Here is the tensor G for k = 2, with Team A (action I) controlling the high-order bits and
Team B (action J) the low-order bits.
G =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
−1 −1 1 0
−1 1 0 1
1 0 1 −1
0 1 −1 −1
⎞
⎟⎟⎠(A.1)
Incidentally note that for every I, there is a GJI = 1, while for every J , there is a G
J
I = −1;
so the pure strategy duality gap of this tensor equals 2, i.e., as bad as the trivial bound.
Appendix B. No defensive gap for the marginal distributions
Here we show that the marginal distribution p in Eq. 3.1 does not provide any nontrivial
defensive gap. This is because there is no γ > 0 for which an upper bound of the form
(B.1) pITJI ≤ 1− γ + γP ITJI
holds for all T, P .
To see this, we may rewrite (B.1) as
(B.2) (p− P )ITJI ≤ (1− γ)(1− P ITJI )
Suppose that TJ =
(
1 1
1 −1
)
and P =
(
1− δ
δ
)
. Then p =
(
(1− δ)2 δ(1− δ)
δ(1− δ) δ2
)
.
So P ITJI = 1−2δ while pITJI = 1−2δ2. Then (p−P )ITJI = 2δ(1− δ) while 1−P ITJI = 2δ,
so that for any γ > 0 the inequality (B.2) fails for all δ < γ.
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